

SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Comments on Arms Policy for the SIG

The pattern of Soviet arms deliveries to the Arab countries since June suggests that the USSR has opted for a selective and limited approach in replacing Arab war losses, both to avoid stimulating preemptive moves by Israel and to avoid the risk of provocative action by the Arabs. During the months of June and July, the USSR mounted a large-scale emergency airlift to the Arab countries designed to deliver defensive equipment -- largely jet interceptors and antiaircraft guns -- to replace some of the heavy Arab losses in these categories. Since mid-summer, the USSR has maintained a more leisurely pace in its arms deliveries, more or less equating with prewar delivery levels. No new advanced weapons systems are known to have been introduced since June. It is currently estimated that the USSR has replaced about \$250 million of the estimated \$400-500 million worth of military equipment destroyed or lost during the Arab-Israeli hostilities.

We would agree with the dissent taken by the CIA member on the question of arms aid to Jordan in view of the risk of Jordan accepting Soviet military assistance. In recent years, Jordan has been under growing pressure from the USSR and the United Arab Command to shift its sources of military supply from the West to the Communist countries. Jordan's present need for combat aircraft and ground forces equipment to replace its recent severe losses has never been greater. While Jordan might be reluctant to shift to Communist suppliers, given its past ties with and political proclivities toward the West, an arms embargo by the West and continued unsettled conditions in the Near East could be sufficient to force such a decision on Jordan.

SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION